A more recent comment also emphasizes facts:
Source: Neil Godfrey, Vridar
https://vridar.org/2024/12/13/the-folly ... ent-330883
I am not commenting in this post on the claims above regarding the supposed limitations or implied conclusions of "Bayes' Theorem" (but previous posts I have written in this thread can perhaps be helpful).
It seems reasonable enough to distinguish between "facts" (held in common to be completely certain) and any hypothesis, interpretation, or opinion based on those facts. (By the way, Pete on this forum is one of the most consistent in insisting on this distinction, and I roughly agree with Pete on where the distinction between fact and hypothesis is drawn in history. The implication is that a hypothesis is frequently built on other hypotheses, suggesting an approach that takes seriously the possibility of high-credibility hypotheses that can adequately fulfill this basis-for-further-hypothesis function.)
But what is a fact? Reference is made to:
(1) details that every historian agrees on
(2) "events" that really happened
And it is suggested that "events" could be a preferable term to "facts."
Is it a preferable term? The word "event" does not necessarily carry any connotation regarding how well established it is, for us, that it is true that the event happened. Imagine someone saying:
"I am not completely certain, but I believe that I brought home some eggs from the store last Monday."
This person either brought home the eggs that day, or they did not bring home the eggs. Either way, that is the "event" that happened. Indeed, "events" happen even if there are no historians, no scientists, no writers of any kind. There are "events" that nobody ever has any awareness of, which nonetheless happen. At least, that is how I suggest we ordinarily think of the term "events"; it refers to things happening, independent of any individual's awareness, independent of any individual's certainty or uncertainty regarding whether the events happened.
Otherwise, we would add to the list of awkward assertions that would presumably be equally intelligible under these interpretations of "event", "historical", and "historically":
"Even if Buddha existed, it was not an event that Buddha existed."
"Even if Buddha existed, Buddha did not exist historically."
"Even if Buddha existed, there was no historical figure of Buddha."
"Even if that Buddha existed should be a historian's conclusion about what is most likely on the basis of the evidence, it was not an event that Buddha existed."
"Even if that Buddha existed should be a historian's conclusion about what is most likely on the basis of the evidence, Buddha did not exist historically."
"Even if that Buddha existed should be a historian's conclusion about what is most likely on the basis of the evidence, there was no historical figure of Buddha."
It seems more reasonable to stick to the "fact" terminology:
"Even if Buddha existed, it is not a fact that Buddha existed."
"Even if that Buddha existed should be a historian's conclusion about what is most likely on the basis of the evidence, it is not a fact that Buddha existed."
This keeps intact the important, strong connotation between a fact and that which has certainty.
Further, it seems possible to determine whether a proposition regarding an "event" is the content of a sentence, without knowing whether the proposition is true or not.
An equivalence between "events" and "facts" might possibly make sense if the emphasis is on all propositions regarding an "event" being classified only as a "fact" (and thus useful for rational explanations) or not a "fact" (and thus useless for rational explanations?).
However, if researchers are allowed to make statements about what seems likely on the basis of the evidence, even if it regards a proposition involving an "event," then it would seem advisable to avoid confusion of the terminology of "events" and "facts."
Does it really make sense that historians are rational to debate more abstract notions such as "understandings of the significance or consequences or causes" of the events they agree on, but that it is somehow not okay for historians to debate the likelihood of propositions regarding event claims, such as (for example) the authorship of Shakespeare's plays, or whether Pythagoras existed, or the authorship of Paul's letters, or whether Apollonius of Tyana existed?
Is historical research not improved if we allow a discussion of the likelihood of certain event claims, which does not falsely suggest that they are facts but which does allow the investigation of their likelihood as a contribution to research that may be relevant to further analysis, in conjunction with the facts?
Can the likelihood of certain event claims be a matter of interest to many, to which historians can bring their expertise? In practice, yes, it would seem so.
Again, of course: trying in good faith to interpret Vridar correctly is hazardous business. Maybe someone else understands what has been said more accurately and can contribute a better interpretation.
Historians on each of the warring sides will pull out from their research sure and certain “facts” that happened and that support their particular argument. Those historians do their homework with all diligence. As a result, all of those historians, on all sides, produce “facts” (I really prefer the term “events” but I’ll leave that aside for now also) on which they each declare with a confidence of 1 that they are true facts that really happened. All sides agree that the facts happened — they all agree with a confidence of 1 that they are true, even though to be mathematical purists they might in the recesses of their minds acknowledge that there is a slimmest of margin of possible theoretical doubt, so small that isn’t enough room on a page to write all the zeros.
So we have a history war raging but all the historians agree on the “facts” that they are arguing about. They all agree – on both sides of the debate – that the same events happened.
So how can they be fighting? Where is the war? It is, of course, in the meaning they see in those “facts”. It is in their respective understandings of the significance or consequences or causes of those “facts”. The battle lines are drawn up over how each side “explains” those facts.
Those explanations, Carrier explicitly says, are in fact “theories” that can be tested with Bayes’ Theorem (p. 48 of Proving History) As testable theories they can be used to predict what one will find in the sources or even what is the likelihood of a certain event having taken place in the past.
Willer and Willer demonstrated that such a claim is misplaced empiricism. Explanations in history are not of the same kind or order as mathematically grounded theories in science. Explanations of the evidence or events/facts in history cannot be predict what one will find in the sources or what a historian will discover happened in the past.
What happens in historical thinking is actually the reverse of that kind of prediction. If a particular piece of evidence if found then it will either strengthen or weaken slightly the Bayesian estimation that such and such evidence would be found — but BT cannot predict that find.
The explanation of the sources, and explanations of events/fact, can never predict other sources or “facts of history”. It is new discoveries in the sources or historical events that will oblige the Bayesian to modify their calculation slightly.
This is why I have tried to argue that a Bayesian description of the sources cannot predict the likelihood of Jesus having existed. If we say that our sources allow at best a 30% chance that there was a historical Jesus, all we are really saying is that if a historical Jesus existed he was 70% different from other figures in history.
So we have a history war raging but all the historians agree on the “facts” that they are arguing about. They all agree – on both sides of the debate – that the same events happened.
So how can they be fighting? Where is the war? It is, of course, in the meaning they see in those “facts”. It is in their respective understandings of the significance or consequences or causes of those “facts”. The battle lines are drawn up over how each side “explains” those facts.
Those explanations, Carrier explicitly says, are in fact “theories” that can be tested with Bayes’ Theorem (p. 48 of Proving History) As testable theories they can be used to predict what one will find in the sources or even what is the likelihood of a certain event having taken place in the past.
Willer and Willer demonstrated that such a claim is misplaced empiricism. Explanations in history are not of the same kind or order as mathematically grounded theories in science. Explanations of the evidence or events/facts in history cannot be predict what one will find in the sources or what a historian will discover happened in the past.
What happens in historical thinking is actually the reverse of that kind of prediction. If a particular piece of evidence if found then it will either strengthen or weaken slightly the Bayesian estimation that such and such evidence would be found — but BT cannot predict that find.
The explanation of the sources, and explanations of events/fact, can never predict other sources or “facts of history”. It is new discoveries in the sources or historical events that will oblige the Bayesian to modify their calculation slightly.
This is why I have tried to argue that a Bayesian description of the sources cannot predict the likelihood of Jesus having existed. If we say that our sources allow at best a 30% chance that there was a historical Jesus, all we are really saying is that if a historical Jesus existed he was 70% different from other figures in history.
Source: Neil Godfrey, Vridar
https://vridar.org/2024/12/13/the-folly ... ent-330883
I am not commenting in this post on the claims above regarding the supposed limitations or implied conclusions of "Bayes' Theorem" (but previous posts I have written in this thread can perhaps be helpful).
It seems reasonable enough to distinguish between "facts" (held in common to be completely certain) and any hypothesis, interpretation, or opinion based on those facts. (By the way, Pete on this forum is one of the most consistent in insisting on this distinction, and I roughly agree with Pete on where the distinction between fact and hypothesis is drawn in history. The implication is that a hypothesis is frequently built on other hypotheses, suggesting an approach that takes seriously the possibility of high-credibility hypotheses that can adequately fulfill this basis-for-further-hypothesis function.)
But what is a fact? Reference is made to:
(1) details that every historian agrees on
(2) "events" that really happened
And it is suggested that "events" could be a preferable term to "facts."
Is it a preferable term? The word "event" does not necessarily carry any connotation regarding how well established it is, for us, that it is true that the event happened. Imagine someone saying:
"I am not completely certain, but I believe that I brought home some eggs from the store last Monday."
This person either brought home the eggs that day, or they did not bring home the eggs. Either way, that is the "event" that happened. Indeed, "events" happen even if there are no historians, no scientists, no writers of any kind. There are "events" that nobody ever has any awareness of, which nonetheless happen. At least, that is how I suggest we ordinarily think of the term "events"; it refers to things happening, independent of any individual's awareness, independent of any individual's certainty or uncertainty regarding whether the events happened.
Otherwise, we would add to the list of awkward assertions that would presumably be equally intelligible under these interpretations of "event", "historical", and "historically":
"Even if Buddha existed, it was not an event that Buddha existed."
"Even if Buddha existed, Buddha did not exist historically."
"Even if Buddha existed, there was no historical figure of Buddha."
"Even if that Buddha existed should be a historian's conclusion about what is most likely on the basis of the evidence, it was not an event that Buddha existed."
"Even if that Buddha existed should be a historian's conclusion about what is most likely on the basis of the evidence, Buddha did not exist historically."
"Even if that Buddha existed should be a historian's conclusion about what is most likely on the basis of the evidence, there was no historical figure of Buddha."
It seems more reasonable to stick to the "fact" terminology:
"Even if Buddha existed, it is not a fact that Buddha existed."
"Even if that Buddha existed should be a historian's conclusion about what is most likely on the basis of the evidence, it is not a fact that Buddha existed."
This keeps intact the important, strong connotation between a fact and that which has certainty.
Further, it seems possible to determine whether a proposition regarding an "event" is the content of a sentence, without knowing whether the proposition is true or not.
An equivalence between "events" and "facts" might possibly make sense if the emphasis is on all propositions regarding an "event" being classified only as a "fact" (and thus useful for rational explanations) or not a "fact" (and thus useless for rational explanations?).
However, if researchers are allowed to make statements about what seems likely on the basis of the evidence, even if it regards a proposition involving an "event," then it would seem advisable to avoid confusion of the terminology of "events" and "facts."
Does it really make sense that historians are rational to debate more abstract notions such as "understandings of the significance or consequences or causes" of the events they agree on, but that it is somehow not okay for historians to debate the likelihood of propositions regarding event claims, such as (for example) the authorship of Shakespeare's plays, or whether Pythagoras existed, or the authorship of Paul's letters, or whether Apollonius of Tyana existed?
Is historical research not improved if we allow a discussion of the likelihood of certain event claims, which does not falsely suggest that they are facts but which does allow the investigation of their likelihood as a contribution to research that may be relevant to further analysis, in conjunction with the facts?
Can the likelihood of certain event claims be a matter of interest to many, to which historians can bring their expertise? In practice, yes, it would seem so.
Again, of course: trying in good faith to interpret Vridar correctly is hazardous business. Maybe someone else understands what has been said more accurately and can contribute a better interpretation.
Statistics: Posted by Peter Kirby — Fri Jan 24, 2025 4:14 pm