Carrier has raised a criticism against Godfrey that is really cruel insofar talks a lot about how Godfrey is perceived my me:
(my bold)
Simple and clear. Note how the Godfrey's reluctance to conclude 50/50 to justify his agnosticism makes him vulnerable to the accusation of ambiguity and even worse than that, to an accusation of hypocrisy (insofar Godfrey doesn't say what is the best mythicist theory that makes him partially doubt that Jesus existed: why doesn't he say? Because of diplomatic reasons).
It is not logically possible to take the position that “we do not know whether Jesus existed or not” (or any equivalent indifference) without some sense of how it could even be the case that he didn’t. In other words, you must be accepting the plausibility of some alternative explanation, which means, some mythicist theory.
Otherwise, if you believe no mythicist theory is plausible enough to argue, by the principle of converse probability, you must believe it is not plausible enough to doubt the historicity of Jesus. Because those are logically identical statements (one entails the other).
Moreover, this cannot be framed outside of probabilities. Otherwise you are handwaving. In other words, logically, to maintain the position “I do not know whether Jesus existed or not” requires assigning near-equal probabilities to both historicity and (at least) some mythicist theory. Because that is what that proposition logically necessarily asserts.
For example, if you think the spread for historicity/myth is 90/10, you would be contradicting yourself to then say “I do not know,” because 90/10 is an assertion that “most probably Jesus existed” (it is then nine times more likely that he did than that he didn’t). So “I do not know” logically necessarily entails a spread closer to 50/50.
Suppose it’s 70/30 (mine is ~ 30/70). You would then be saying it is plausible Jesus didn’t exist (a good 1 in 3 chance even) but more likely that he did (about twice as likely, in fact). Which does not entail “I do not know” (and you are contradicting yourself) because it entails you know it’s a bit more likely (whereas I say it’s a bit less likely). That would warrant vague statements of uncertainty. But it does not warrant declaring “we know nothing at all about it.” That it is twice as likely Jesus existed than that he didn’t is knowing something about it.
This is why attending to what your words actually mean in terms of the logic of probability is essential. Because, first, you otherwise hide these facts under ambiguities ripe for equivocation fallacies and other errors of logic and, second, by avoiding actually saying what you mean in terms of the logic of probability, you avoid having to justify why those are your conclusions, when you shouldn’t be doing that. You should be doing the opposite: endeavoring to ascertain why you believe in the probabilities you do, and whether those reasons are even logically valid (much less sound, another distinction of logic anyone must be able to make to be doing this well).
Otherwise, if you believe no mythicist theory is plausible enough to argue, by the principle of converse probability, you must believe it is not plausible enough to doubt the historicity of Jesus. Because those are logically identical statements (one entails the other).
Moreover, this cannot be framed outside of probabilities. Otherwise you are handwaving. In other words, logically, to maintain the position “I do not know whether Jesus existed or not” requires assigning near-equal probabilities to both historicity and (at least) some mythicist theory. Because that is what that proposition logically necessarily asserts.
For example, if you think the spread for historicity/myth is 90/10, you would be contradicting yourself to then say “I do not know,” because 90/10 is an assertion that “most probably Jesus existed” (it is then nine times more likely that he did than that he didn’t). So “I do not know” logically necessarily entails a spread closer to 50/50.
Suppose it’s 70/30 (mine is ~ 30/70). You would then be saying it is plausible Jesus didn’t exist (a good 1 in 3 chance even) but more likely that he did (about twice as likely, in fact). Which does not entail “I do not know” (and you are contradicting yourself) because it entails you know it’s a bit more likely (whereas I say it’s a bit less likely). That would warrant vague statements of uncertainty. But it does not warrant declaring “we know nothing at all about it.” That it is twice as likely Jesus existed than that he didn’t is knowing something about it.
This is why attending to what your words actually mean in terms of the logic of probability is essential. Because, first, you otherwise hide these facts under ambiguities ripe for equivocation fallacies and other errors of logic and, second, by avoiding actually saying what you mean in terms of the logic of probability, you avoid having to justify why those are your conclusions, when you shouldn’t be doing that. You should be doing the opposite: endeavoring to ascertain why you believe in the probabilities you do, and whether those reasons are even logically valid (much less sound, another distinction of logic anyone must be able to make to be doing this well).
(my bold)
Simple and clear. Note how the Godfrey's reluctance to conclude 50/50 to justify his agnosticism makes him vulnerable to the accusation of ambiguity and even worse than that, to an accusation of hypocrisy (insofar Godfrey doesn't say what is the best mythicist theory that makes him partially doubt that Jesus existed: why doesn't he say? Because of diplomatic reasons).
Statistics: Posted by Giuseppe — Tue Jan 07, 2025 9:27 am